TY - JOUR
T1 - Risk of infection of dairy cattle in the EU with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus affecting dairy cows in the United States of America (H5N1, Eurasian lineage goose/Guangdong clade 2.3.4.4b. genotype B3.13)
AU - Alvarez, Julio
AU - Boklund, Anette Ella
AU - Dippel, Sabine
AU - Dorea, Fernanda
AU - Figuerola, Jordi
AU - Herskin, Mette S.
AU - Michel, Virginie
AU - Chueca, Miguel Angel Miranda
AU - Nannoni, Eleonora
AU - Nielsen, Soren Saxmose
AU - Nonno, Romolo
AU - Riber, Anja B.
AU - Stegeman, Jan Arend
AU - Stahl, Karl
AU - Thulke, Hans-hermann
AU - Tuyttens, Frank
AU - Winckler, Christoph
AU - Bortolami, Alessio
AU - Ducatez, Mariette
AU - Guinat, Claire
AU - Abdelwhab, El-Sayed M.
AU - Guillier, Laurent
AU - Nauta, Maarten
AU - Papademas, Photis
AU - Suffredini, Elisabetta
AU - Messens, Winy
AU - Broglia, Alessandro
AU - Jensen, Helene
AU - Kryemadhi, Kamela
AU - Gervelmeyer, Andrea
AU - Ahaw, EFSA Panel Anim Hlth Welf
PY - 2025/12/18
Y1 - 2025/12/18
N2 - This opinion assesses the risk of avian influenza H5N1 B3.13 genotype virus infection in EU dairy cattle. Introduction of the virus into EU dairy cattle, poultry or wild birds via trade or migratory birds from the US is assessed as highly unlikely. The potential impact in case of introduction is estimated as high for most Member States. Measures assessed as most effective to prevent introduction of the virus are avoiding importation of cattle and poultry from infected countries, and cleaning and disinfection of milking equipment. Measures assessed as most effective to prevent spread of the virus in the EU are milking hygiene, banning movement of cattle in infected areas, avoiding the exchange of workers, vehicles and equipment, and implementing biosecurity measures before entering farms. Regarding adaptation of current highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) surveillance, a proportional, risk-based preparedness strategy is recommended, including (i) awareness raising to strengthen passive and syndromic surveillance, (ii) targeted investigations of suspicions/outbreaks after confirmed exposure of cattle to HPAI, (iii) using sensitive diagnostics on multiple sample types and (iv) regional active surveillance (bulk milk reverse transcription quantitative polymerase chain reaction (RT-qPCR)) following first detections in cattle. In case the virus is identified in wild birds or poultry, surveillance of dairy farms in the affected area should be considered. The contamination of bulk milk is considered very likely, if EU dairy herds become infected, as cows may not show clear clinical signs and may shed the virus before changes in milk become apparent. If EU bulk milk or colostrum are contaminated with the virus, food-borne exposure of consumers to viable virus would be highest for raw drinking milk, raw colostrum and raw milk cream. To date, however, no confirmed cases of food-borne human infection with H5N1 B3.13 genotype virus have been reported.
AB - This opinion assesses the risk of avian influenza H5N1 B3.13 genotype virus infection in EU dairy cattle. Introduction of the virus into EU dairy cattle, poultry or wild birds via trade or migratory birds from the US is assessed as highly unlikely. The potential impact in case of introduction is estimated as high for most Member States. Measures assessed as most effective to prevent introduction of the virus are avoiding importation of cattle and poultry from infected countries, and cleaning and disinfection of milking equipment. Measures assessed as most effective to prevent spread of the virus in the EU are milking hygiene, banning movement of cattle in infected areas, avoiding the exchange of workers, vehicles and equipment, and implementing biosecurity measures before entering farms. Regarding adaptation of current highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) surveillance, a proportional, risk-based preparedness strategy is recommended, including (i) awareness raising to strengthen passive and syndromic surveillance, (ii) targeted investigations of suspicions/outbreaks after confirmed exposure of cattle to HPAI, (iii) using sensitive diagnostics on multiple sample types and (iv) regional active surveillance (bulk milk reverse transcription quantitative polymerase chain reaction (RT-qPCR)) following first detections in cattle. In case the virus is identified in wild birds or poultry, surveillance of dairy farms in the affected area should be considered. The contamination of bulk milk is considered very likely, if EU dairy herds become infected, as cows may not show clear clinical signs and may shed the virus before changes in milk become apparent. If EU bulk milk or colostrum are contaminated with the virus, food-borne exposure of consumers to viable virus would be highest for raw drinking milk, raw colostrum and raw milk cream. To date, however, no confirmed cases of food-borne human infection with H5N1 B3.13 genotype virus have been reported.
KW - bulk milk
KW - dairy cattle
KW - food safety
KW - mitigation
KW - surveillance
U2 - 10.2903/j.efsa.2025.9801
DO - 10.2903/j.efsa.2025.9801
M3 - A1: Web of Science-article
SN - 1831-4732
VL - 23
JO - EFSA Journal
JF - EFSA Journal
IS - 12
M1 - e9801
ER -